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Abstract: Fuzzy vault is a well-known technique to address the privacy concerns in biometric identification applications.
We revisit the fuzzy vault scheme to address implementation, efficiency, and security issues encountered in
its realization. We use the fingerprint data as a case study. We compare the performances of two different
methods used in the implementation of fuzzy vault, namely brute force and Reed Solomon decoding. We
show that the locations of fake (chaff) points in the vault leak information on the genuine points and propose
a new chaff point placement technique that makes distinguishing genuine points impossible. We also propose
a novel method for creation of chaff points that decreases the success rate of the brute force attack from 100%
to less than 3.5%. While this paper lays out a complete guideline as to how the fuzzy vault is implemented in
an efficient and secure way, it also points out that more research is needed to thwart the proposed attacks by
presenting ideas for future research.
1 INTRODUCTION
Identification for access control and other purposes
can be achieved by utilizing three factors: 1) what you
know (e.g. passwords), 2) what you have (e.g. smart-
cards), and 3) what you are (biometric data identify-
ing a person). Either these factors can be used alone
or any combination of the three can be used together
to increase security and compensate the weaknesses
of one factor. While passwords can be forgotten and
smartcards can be stolen, a biometric is inseparable
from an individual and always accessible providing
comparably high level of security. In addition, it can
easily be combined with other factors to increase se-
curity further. Biometric identification, on the other
hand, also suffers from two major drawbacks: 1) the
noisy nature of biometrics measurement process and
2) privacy issues due to the fact that biometric data re-
veals private information about the individuals which
is not intended to be revealed otherwise.
(Juels and Sudan, 2002) proposed the so-called
fuzzy vault scheme to overcome these two drawbacks
associated with biometrics usage in identification.
The main idea is to exploit the relationship between
error correction and secret sharing — the biometric
data together with a secret defines a codeword from
an appropriate error correction code. Given the fin-
gerprint, the codeword can be corrected, and the se-
cret is extracted. However, the secret does not re-
veal anything about the biometric data. If the secret is
compromised, one can always choose another secret
to combine with the same biometric.
A successful application of fuzzy vault to finger-
print biometrics is due to (Uludag et al., 2005) that ba-
sically uses the brute force approach. Different from
Clancy’s work they used alignment helper data which
decreases the error rates, and also a Cyclic Redun-
dancy Check (CRC) embedded in a coefficient of the
secret polynomial is used to guarantee that the correct
polynomial is found.
In this paper, we focus on several issues involv-
ing fuzzy vault implementation for biometrics usage.
The first issue is to compare the computational effi-
ciencies of the aforementioned two methods, namely
brute-force and RS decoding methods. Another issue
we deal with is to analyze some security drawbacks of
the fuzzy vault scheme and propose solutions to those
weaknesses as outlined below:
• The locations of the points in the vault may reveal
some information as to which points are genuine
depending on the chaff point generation. We pro-
pose a method in Section 4.1 that makes distin-
guishing genuine points impossible.
• Mihailescu (Mihailescu, 2007) pointed out that
the fuzzy vault scheme is vulnerable to brute force
attack. We propose a new method in Section 4.2 to
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decrease the success rate of this attack from 100%
to less than 3.5%. This countermeasure proves to
be useful in certain settings.
• We study the effects of distances between chaff
points and between a chaff and a genuine point on
the security of the fuzzy vault.
• We also study limitations on the vault size and
its effects on the security and performance of the
fuzzy vault.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives a review of the fuzzy vault scheme and
explains the most important details of the brute force
and Reed Solomon decoding algorithms (Roth, 2006)
used for reconstructing the secret polynomial hidden
in the fuzzy vault. Section 3 provides comparative
analysis for the performance of two techniques used
in polynomial reconstruction. Section 4 outlines two
proposed modifications to the enrollment stage to in-
crease the security of the fuzzy vault and summarizes
the security analysis of the scheme against brute force
attack. Section 5 explores the effects of the vault and
threshold sizes on the performance and security of the
fuzzy vault using experimental data. It also provides
a timing comparison between brute force and RS de-
coding methods. Section 6 is devoted to the summary
of the paper and proposes a new idea for future work.
2 REVIEW OF FUZZY VAULT
In this section we give a brief outline for the tech-
niques used in the application of fuzzy vault scheme
to fingerprint biometrics. The identification process
using the fuzzy vault consists of two major stages: the
enrollment and verification. In the enrollment stage,
the fuzzy vault is created by embedding a secret poly-
nomial after the fingerprint of the user is obtained.
The fuzzy vault hides the fingerprint and the secret
polynomial, which can be revealed if the same finger
is used in verification. The verification stage contains
two phases: 1) the alignment of the measured finger-
print to the points in the fuzzy vault, and 2) the re-
construction of the secret polynomial. The enrollment
and alignment stages are the same for both brute force
and RS decoding methods that differ in the polyno-
mial reconstruction phase. The details of enrollment
and allignment stages are provided in (Juels and Su-
dan, 2002), (Clancy et al., 2003), therefore only the
polynomial reconstruction stage is described briefly
in the following two sections.
2.1 Brute Force Approach
To reconstruct the secret polynomial using brute force
approach requires trying all the combinations of size k
given m matching minutiae points. Note that some of
the m matching minutiae points are the ones that ac-
tually match random chaff points in the fuzzy vault.
When k minutiae points that match the real minu-
tiae points are found during the exhaustive search, the
scheme is said to be successful.
In brute force approach, first k pairs of (xi,yi) are
chosen randomly from the verification list and the
polynomial on which the selected k pairs lie is cal-
culated using Lagrange interpolation method. Then
whether µ of the remaining vault points satisfies yi =
p(xi) is tested. If more points that lie on the same
polynomial are found, the fingerprint is verified; oth-
erwise rejected. If insufficient number of pairs satisfy
yi = p(xi) condition, another random k pairs are taken
as input and the process is repeated. The maximum
number of trials is set to a high value, after which the
program rejects the fingerprint if no polynomial sat-
isfying the condition is found. The drawback of the
brute force approach is high computation complexity
when the tested fingerprint is too noisy.
2.2 Reed Solomon Decoding Approach
When we construct the fuzzy vault we evaluate the
secret polynomial for all n minutiae points, i.e. yi =
p(xi) for i = 1, . . .n. This can be put into a matrix-
vector formulation as follows:
[
y1 y2 . . . yn
]
=
[
p0 p1 . . . pk−1
]
G
where the matrix G is the generator matrix (Roth,
2006).
It is crucial to notice that the generator matrix
changes for each user, which differ from the conven-
tional application of RS encoding method. Since the
enrollment stage essentially utilizes the RS encoding,
the reconstruction of the secret polynomial in the ver-
ification stage can be achieved by employing an RS-
Decoder.
Utilizing error correcting codes for the implemen-
tation of fuzzy vault is first proposed by (Juels and
Sudan, 2002). The authors state that after matching
minutiae points are obtained, use of Reed-Solomon
(RS) decoder is a more efficient approach than the
brute force. The Reed-Solomon decoders have an
error correction capability of τ = m−k2 errors. The
best choice to implement RS decoder is to use the
Berlekamp-Massey (BM) algorithm as explained also
in (Clancy et al., 2003) since it is fast, easy to imple-
ment and widely studied.
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The RS decoding with BM algorithm takes two
vectors (v = [x1,x2, . . . ,xm] and y = [y1,y2, . . . ,ym])
as explained previously and returns the error locater
polynomial (ELP). Since ELP shows the locations of
all errors, the rest of the data must be correct.
Finally, the secret polynomial can be recon-
structed by using the Lagrange interpolation method
with the correct minutia points if the number of errors
does not exceed τ. Otherwise, the function returns a
wrong polynomial of degree k− 1. Again we check
if more points that lie on the same polynomial exist.
Otherwise, the function is called with fewer number
of pairs. This process is repeated several times with
some of the different random pairs being removed
from the list. If the algorithm still returns a wrong
polynomial as output after several attempts, then the
fingerprint is rejected.
3 COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY
OF POLYNOMIAL
RECONSTRUCTION
In (Clancy et al., 2003), Clancy et al. argue that us-
ing the RS decoder is a better approach than the brute
force method if the attacker cannot eliminate some of
the chaff points from the verification list. But the au-
thors do not provide a comparison between the two
approaches. In this paper we try to clarify as to which
method is optimal depending on the parameters of m
and k where m is the number of matched points and k
is one more than the degree of the secret polynomial.
For comparing the two approaches, we calculate
the number of operations in the secret polynomial
reconstruction phase for both methods. For sake of
simplicity, we ignore addition and assignment opera-
tions and only count multiplication and inverse oper-
ations in Fq since the latter two operations dominate
the computation.
3.1 Complexity of RS Decoder
The Reed Solomon decoder has four steps as ex-
plained in (Roth, 2006) and complexity of each step
and the total complexity is given in Table 1. We as-
sume that Step 3 always returns an error locater poly-
nomial; i.e. the measured fingerprint always leads to
matchings to chaff points.
From the perspective of complexity comparison,
the main difference between the brute force and the
RS decoding approaches is that, RS decoder can dis-
tinguish a genuine fingerprint in only one trial if the
number of incorrect matchings is less than the error
Table 1: Operational Complexity of RS Decoding Method.
Step Multiplication Inv.
1. Constructing H 3m2−2mk m
2. Syndrome Computation m(m−k) -
3. Finding Error Locations m(k2/3+2) -
4. Polynomial Construction k2 -
Total 4m2 +m(k2/3) m
−m(3k +2)+k2
correcting capability of the RS code τ. On the other
hand, the brute force approach may have to perform
excessively many trials to complete the verification
process.
3.2 Complexity of Brute Force Method
Complexity of the brute force method is given in Ta-
ble 2. Selecting k random points out of m matched
points (i.e. Step 1 in the table) involves a randomized
algorithm, whose complexity we estimate as equiva-
lent to k multiplication operations. The variable l in
the last row of Table 2 stands for the number of trials
needed on average, which naturally increases with the
error in the tested fingerprint. Without knowing the
number of trials l in the brute force method it is not
easy to compare two methods. Comparison is only
possible with experiments on real and synthetic data,
which we achieve in Section 5.
Table 2: Operational Complexity of Brute Force Method.
Phase Multiplication Inv.
1. Choosing k random points k -
2. Polynomial Construction k2 -
3. Verification of the result 5m -
Total l(k2 +5m+k) -
4 NEW ENROLLMENT STAGE
In this section, we explain two proposed modifica-
tions to the enrollment stage in order to strengthen the
fuzzy vault against possible attacks.
4.1 Distribution of Chaff Points
Creation of random chaff points is crucial since they
should be uniformly distributed in the minutiae space
so that an attacker, having access to the vault, should
not be able to distinguish between genuine minutiae
points and random chaff points (Kholmatov et al.,
2006). If the chaff points were created with the con-
dition that every point in the vault should be at least
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t Euclidean distance apart to supply a uniform distri-
bution as proposed by (Juels and Sudan, 2002), the
fuzzy vault could leak some information about the lo-
cation of genuine points. We have no control over the
locations of genuine points, as some of them might
be very close to each other as exemplified in Figure 1
where chaff points are represented as circles and gen-
uine points as circles with crosses. If an attacker inter-
cepts a fuzzy vault, he can locate some of the genuine
points correctly by checking the distances between
the points; i.e. if the distance between two points is
closer than the threshold t, then these points are gen-
uine.
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Figure 1: Fuzzy vault as implemented described in (Juels
and Sudan, 2002) where genuine points are marked.
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Figure 2: Fuzzy vault with chaff points being placed ac-
cording to a new scheme.
As a remedy, we generate the chaff points with
the condition that every chaff point in the vault should
be at least t Euclidean distance apart from a genuine
point and should be at least t ′ Euclidean distance apart
from any other chaff point. Note that t ′ < t since hav-
ing chaff points far from the genuine points are de-
sirable and have a positive effect on false reject rate
(FRR) as demonstrated in Section 5. Smaller thresh-
old t ′, on the other hand, for inter-chaff point dis-
tance is necessary to imitate the distribution of gen-
uine points where close genuine points occasionally
occur in the vault. While t value depends on the fin-
gerprint image size and the total number of points in
the vault, t ′ should be chosen depending on the dis-
tribution of genuine points. For finger print image
of 500 pixels, Figure 2 shows the fuzzy vault con-
structed with the new chaff point placement strategy,
where the threshold values t and t ′ are chosen as 18
and 8, respectively. As seen in Figure 2, the distri-
bution of chaff points in the fuzzy vault closely re-
sembles the distribution of genuine points, hence an
attacker cannot easily distinguish the genuine points
from the chaff points.
4.2 A Novel Method for Chaff Point
Placement
Note that there are C points in the vault where n
of them are genuine and the secret polynomial has
degree k− 1. Mihailescu proved that in less than
8Ck(C/n)k operations1, the intruder can recover the
secret polynomial (Mihailescu, 2007). The idea of the
attack relies on the established fact (Juels and Sudan,
2002) that when there are more than D vault points on
a polynomial of degree k− 1 for D ∈ (k− 1,n), this
polynomial is the secret polynomial with a very high
probability.
Our proposed method to improve the security in-
volves the idea that, by choosing the chaff points at
random, but in a more clever way, we can embed some
other (randomly chosen) polynomials of degree k−1
other than the secret polynomial in the vault. If we
guarantee that the number of chaff points that lie on
these (fake) polynomials, is around n - the same num-
ber of genuine points on the secret polynomial on av-
erage - the attacker cannot distinguish the secret poly-
nomial from the fake ones. Otherwise the attacker
who succeeds to construct a polynomial can discard it
if there are fewer points. One way of choosing non-
random points is described below:
1. Place the genuine points in the vault
2. Keep the unassigned chaff points in a pool
3. Keep a list of fake polynomials which is initially
empty
4. Repeat until the pool is empty
(a) Pick a random number r close to n
(b) For the first fake polynomial, take random k−1
points from the vault and take one random point
1By operation it is meant that atomic arithmetic opera-
tions such as additions and multiplications.
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from the pool. For others take random k points
from the vault.
(c) Find the (k−1)st degree polynomial that passes
through the selected points. Add the polyno-
mial to the list if it is not already in it.
(d) Check the vault if there are any other points that
lie on the polynomial. Decrement r by the num-
ber of points on this polynomial.
(e) Pick r points from the pool (or the remaining
points if their number is less than r) and eval-
uate these points on the fake polynomial and
place the resulting values in the fuzzy vault.
With the proposed chaff placement method, we al-
low each polynomial intersect with other polynomials
in at least k vault points which increases the maximum
number of polynomials we can embed into the vault.
Note that any two polynomials cannot intersect with
each other in more than k−1 points. As a result of our
experiments in our setting described above, we are
able to hide around 30 fake polynomials in the vault.
Therefore, this method decreases the probability of
finding the secret polynomial using Mihailescu’s at-
tack from 100% to approximately 3.3% after the brute
force attack is applied. Due to the fact that most of the
identification applications allow only limited number
of trials, the proposed method enhance the security
considerably. Moreover, the method does not affect
the false accept or false reject rates since the match-
ing algorithm considers only the x coordinates of the
points and this method changes only the y coordi-
nates.
4.3 Security Analysis
The attacks on the fuzzy vault scheme, mostly assume
the interception of a vault from a database. The basic
attack is the brute force attack over a single vault. The
analysis in this work based on the work of Mihailescu
(Mihailescu, 2007), shows that this attack is not com-
putationally infeasible, therefore fuzzy vault scheme
is insecure without additional security.
If an attacker intercepts a vault, but has no other
information about the locations of the genuine points,
the best method to recover the secret polynomial is
the brute force trials (Clancy et al., 2003)(Mihailescu,
2007). Mihailescu provides a strong brute force attack
in (Mihailescu, 2007), which finds the secret polyno-
mial in less than 8(Ck)(C/n)k operations where C is
the number of points in the vault, n is the number of
genuine points in the vault and the degree of the secret
polynomial is k−1.
In our tests n parameter is on the average 35
and k is constant 10. For C = 300, which gives a
better FRR, breaking the system requires 8× 300×
10× (300/35)10 ≈ 246 operations. For C = 350,
which gives a worse FRR, the system provides a bet-
ter security; breaking the system requires this time
8×350×10× (350/35)10≈ 248 operations.
Without the use of the proposed method in section
4.2, the secret polynomial is found with probability
1 after this attack. However, our proposed method
decrease the probability to approximately 0.03 since
the polynomial found as a result of brute force attack
is not guaranteed to be the secret polynomial.
5 TEST RESULTS
We implement polynomial reconstruction phase using
two previously discussed approaches: 1) brute force
method and 2) RS decoding.
For the implementations, we use a database of
180 people where there are two fingerprint images
for each finger, totaling 360 fingerprints. The first
180 fingerprint images are used for enrollment and
the second 180 images are used for verification of the
corresponding fingerprints. Later, all fingerprints are
cross-tested for false accept rates. In the experimental
setting bitmap images of 500×500 pixels are created
for each fingerprint.
All computations and tests are performed on a
computer with 1.7 GHz Intel Celeron M processor
and 448MB of RAM. The codes are developed in ei-
ther Matlab or C++ (Microsoft Visual Studio) depend-
ing on the nature of the problem.
We basically investigate two issues; firstly, the ef-
fects of the vault and threshold sizes on the perfor-
mance and security of the fuzzy vault, and secondly
time efficiencies of two methods used in the polyno-
mial reconstruction phase of the verification stage.
5.1 Effects of Vault and Threshold Sizes
The false reject rates (FRR) and false accept rates
(FAR) are calculated in four settings where different
values for vault size and minimum distance threshold
are used for our database of fingerprints. We use vault
sizes of 300 and 350 points and minimum distance
thresholds of (t = 15) and (t = 18). The minimum
distance between any two chaff points is taken as 8.
We calculate the FAR and FRR results for both the
brute force and the RS decoding methods.
The FAR rates turn out to be 0% in all settings
after cross testing all fingerprint images with different
fingers in four settings.
Table 3 shows the FRRs for different vault sizes
and threshold values. The results clearly demonstrate
IMPROVED FUZZY VAULT SCHEME FOR FINGERPRINT VERIFICATION
41
Table 3: FRR for four different settings.
Vault Size
Threshold (t) 300 350
15 6.5% 9%
18 1.5% 4.5%
that as the minimum distance between two points in-
creases, the possibility of a genuine point matching to
a chaff point decreases resulting in lower FRRs. Al-
though the two values of threshold used in the exper-
iments have the same security level, increasing it fur-
ther may become impossible after certain point since
we cannot place as many points as we desired. Sim-
ilarly, when more chaff points are added to the vault,
the possibility of a genuine point matching to a chaff
point increases. Larger vault size results in higher se-
curity. The security impact of vault size was analyzed
in Section 4.3.
5.2 Timing Results for Polynomial
Reconstruction Phase
As explained before, verification phase is the main
part where two approaches are compared in terms
of timing and success performance. The “Number
Theory Library” (NTL) (Shoup, 2008) is used for
all the operations in the polynomial reconstruction.
For both approaches, the polynomial reconstruction
algorithms take two vectors x = {x1,x2, . . . ,xm} and
y = {y1,y2, . . . ,ym} where yi = P(xi) for the points
matched to a genuine point and yi 6= P(xi) for the
points matched to a chaff point.
We first compare the timing results of the two ap-
proaches using our database of real fingerprints. In
case of true fingerprints we find that for 15% of the
data, the RS decoding approach is faster. For forgery
data, RS decoding method is naturally always faster
since concluding that a fingerprint is a forgery takes
1000 trials in our experiments.
Considering that the database used in the exper-
iments may not fully represent all cases, especially
the ones with high levels of noise in measurement
process, we use synthetic data to control the number
matched points in the alignment process. We generate
synthetic fingerprints and corresponding fuzzy vaults
of 350 total points, where the number of matched
points are in the range of [21,35]. Timing results
of the experiment for changing number of matched
points are shown in Figure 3(a). As clearly observed
in the figure, the brute force method takes much
longer when the number of matching points are low
due to excessive number of trials to find the correct
matching points. As the number of matching points
increases, the brute force becomes faster. We also
provide the same graphic for number of operations in
Figure 3(b), that we obtain in our theoretical analysis.
The similarity of two figures show that the experimen-
tal results are in line with the theoretical analysis
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Figure 3: Comparison of complexities of two methods.
The experiments demonstrate that the optimal
method changes depending on the number of genuine
points matched. The brute force approach is faster if
the matching is very good (i.e. most of the minutiae
points are matched to genuine points) since it will re-
quire very few trials to find the polynomial. On the
other hand, the RS decoder is very fast to reject a
forgery since brute force will require excessive num-
ber of trials to decide on a reject. Also for a weak
matching of a valid fingerprint, the RS decoder is
again faster.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
In this paper, we addressed the implementation, se-
curity, and performance issues of fuzzy vault for bio-
metric identification. We first provided a guideline
that briefly explains the implementation steps of de-
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coding using two methods: brute force and Reed-
Solomon (RS). We then compared the efficiencies of
the two methods. The results shows that for weak
matching, the RS decoding method is more efficient;
but for good matching, the brute force method works
faster. For the success rate of verification, they both
give the same false accept rate (FAR) and false reject
rate (FRR).
We proposed a new chaff point placement method
to prevent some inferences on the location of gen-
uine points. By adjusting the distance between points
(genuine-to-chaff and chaff-to-chaff) we showed that
it is possible to increase security and performance of
the fuzzy vault implementation.
We explored the effects and limitations of the
vault size on the security and performance of the
fuzzy vault. The higher number of chaff points in
the vault is demonstrated to strengthen the method
against the most successful attack. However, plac-
ing more chaff points takes more time and becomes
impossible after certain number and has an adverse
effect on the FRR rate.
We proposed to embed a number of fake polyno-
mials in the fuzzy vault along with the secret polyno-
mial to reduce the success rate of the attacker. We suc-
ceeded in placing only limited number of fake poly-
nomials in the vault. We believe that further research
will reveal more efficient methods to place higher
number of fake polynomials in the vault, that will fur-
ther increase the security.
Other than the brute force attack, there is another
attack that can be applied in the presence of two vaults
that belong to the same biometric (Kholmatov and
Yanikoglu, 2008). The correlation attack basically
utilizes two vaults of the same fingerprint to reveal
most of the minutiae points by cross-matching the two
vaults. The correlation attack takes advantage of the
fact that minutiae point locations are almost the same
in two vaults and increasing the vault size has only
limited effect on the security. A more effective solu-
tion will be keeping a distorted version of the biomet-
ric that preserves the invariants of the biometric im-
age. For instance, Sutcu et al. (Sutcu et al., 2005)
proposed a method that uses Gaussian function for
distortion of the biometric. We plan to use a special
hash function that gives similar outputs for inputs that
differ by a few bits. By keeping the hash values of the
fingerprint minutiae values and performing matching
in the hash space, we can avoid the correlation at-
tacks. The effectiveness of this method remains to
be analyzed which we plan to pursue as future work.
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